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Hopefully this friendly exchange between Martyn Hammersley and I has 
clarified some issues.  Some of the muddier points will have to wait for another day 
before being polished up.  And others reflect different images of social research that 
are unlikely to be reconciled.  However, it is worth devoting a little further 
consideration to questions of construction and reality.   
Hammersley suggests that Representing Reality (Potter, 1996) equivocates 
between a methodological and a philosophical relativism.  I see it rather as setting 
aside philosophical arguments about relativism (which are strongly pressed, of 
course, in Edwards et al., 1995) in order to focus on the development of a systematic 
constructionist position.  One of the confusions in a lot of constructionist work, and 
in (often understandable) critiques of constructionism, is the idea that showing that a 
description is constructed amounts to showing that it is not true.  Representing 
Reality’s systematic, and symmetrical constructionist position argues that 
researchers should consider all accounts, descriptions, versions and so as 
constructed (out of words, idioms, categories, repertoires and so on).  Its topic is how 
descriptions are constructed, in particular sequences and settings, in a way that is 
oriented to a range of actions. 
Hammersley suggests I use a variation on an ancient sceptic argument that ‘to 
judge whether a representations is accurate we would have to be able to compare it to 
reality, yet we have not access to reality itself only to accounts of it’ and he suggests I 
make the epistemic inference that ‘only knowledge claims whose validity has been 
demonstrated beyond all possible doubt can be accepted as true’ (2003: **).  Let me 
emphasise that the arguments here have a methodological focus.  Rather than being 
a sceptic’s thought experiment this is the practical situation that faces discourse 
researchers.  As such we are not in a position of being able to compare 
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representations to reality; rather we are comparing different representations: of 
partners in a relationship, say, or of a police officer and suspect.  Whatever the 
philosophical implications, this provides a coherent and practical basis for studying 
descriptions and how they are constructed. 
   Mapping the Language of Racism (Wetherell and Potter, 1992) predates 
Representing Reality.  However, despite Hammersley’s strong assertions to the 
opposite I don’t think it is radically inconsistent with the perspective developed in 
that book.  It not written as a ‘pure’ piece of discourse analysis – it includes an 
ethnographic strand of analysis of interviews and documents.  However, it is not 
offering a realist history of New Zealand and its racial conflicts.  We made that point 
strongly, for example, with the issue of the ‘discovery’ of New Zealand: 
We do want to argue that there is a crucial sense in which 'New Zealand' didn't 
actually exist until it was discovered.  Then, when it was discovered by 
Polynesian voyagers, by Abel Tasman and most recently by Captain Cook (and 
given various different names), it became several different objects.  As 
Brannigan (1981) has pointed out for the discovery of America, there are 
sometimes a range of competing discovery claims.  But these are not claims to 
have discovered the same object; rather the precise definition of what the 
object is, is the outcome of the process of discovery, definition and articulation 
(Woolgar, 1988) (Wetherell and Potter, 1992: 64). 
In general, the historical narrative, the social groupings and interests and so on that 
are discussed are integral to the analysis, yes, but they are not excluded from issues 
of construction.  Nor are they prerequisites for the analysis.  They aid its 
interpretation, and help guide its implications for New Zealand. 
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Intentions are subject to the same sort of consideration.  Hammersley claims 
that ‘even to describe an action as, for example, a stake inoculation is not only to 
attribute an intention, in some sense of that word, but also to hint at motives that the 
person concerned might have had for engaging in this action’ (2003: **).  This is 
precisely the kind of cognitivism that discursive psychology has criticised over a long 
period.  Whether or not stake inoculation suggests some sense of intention and hints 
at motive, these things are not being used to explain what is going on.  In DP they 
appear as topic.  As Edwards and Potter (in press) write: 
 the main thrust of DP is not to close down psychology departments, but to 
counter and invert what mainstream psychology has done with discourse, 
which is to treat it as the expression of thoughts, intentions and cognitive 
structures.  The ‘inversion’ offered by DP is to start with discourse itself, and 
to see how all of those presumptively prior and independent notions of mind, 
intention, motive, etc., are topicalized, categorized and, in various less direct 
ways, handled and managed within discourse itself (in press: **). 
As I have noted before, this is not the only programmatic way of approaching 
discourse.  However, it is coherent and it has been honed in over a decade of research 
studies.  The strongest test is its ability to provide striking analyses of particular 
phenomena and to provide more coherent, detailed and generative analyses than 
alternative available approaches from within and outwith discourse analysis.  
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